Movement and Countermovement: Loosely Coupled Conflict by Zald, Mayer N. & Useem, Bert
..................................... 
Movement and Countermovement: 
Loosely Coupled Conf l i c t  
Mayer N. Zald 
Univers i ty  of Michigan 
Bert  Useem 
Univers i ty  of I l l i n o i s  
a t  Chicago C i r c l e  
October 1983 ...................................... 
CRSO Working Paper 302 Copies a v a i l a b l e  through : 
Center f o r  Research on S o c i a l  
Organizat ion 
Univers i ty  of ~ i c h i g a n  
330 Packard S t r e e t  
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 
; Movement and Countermovement: Loosely Coupled Conflict* 
Mayer N. Zald 
Department of Sociology and.Schoo1 of Social Work 
University of Michigan 
Bert Useem 
Department of Sociology 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
June 14, 1983 
*We are indebted to Emilie Schmeidler and Linda Kaboolian for 
discussion ofmany of the ideas in this paper. We are also grateful to 
Brian Ewart, Peter Ki.bal1, John McCarthy, Kathy Pearce, Mildred Schwartz, 
and Charles Tilly for comments, This paper was developed while we studied 
the pro and antinuclear power movements with grants from The Society for 
the Psychological Study of Social Issues, the Phoenix Memorial Project 
of the University of Michigan, and from a Department of Energy grant to 
the University. During the course of this research, Useem held a post- 
doctoral Fellowship under an NIMH Training Grant on Sociology and Social 
Policy. 
An earlier version of the paper was presented at Annual Meetings of 
the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, CA Sept. 8, 1982. -. 
Abstract 
Movements often provide the impetus for countermovements to mobilize. 
Movement and Countermovement (M/CM) then engage in loosely coupled conflict 
as each attempts to win support from bystanders and authori*ies. 
The paper discusses 1) getting started problems of countermovement 
mobilization; 2) the battle joined, strategies and tactics of inter- 
action; 3) the relation of movements and countermovements to authorities. 
Hypotheses are developed. Illustrations are drawn from several M/CM 
interactions and some data from a study.of the antinuclear power/pronuclear 
power movement. 
Movement and Countermovement: Loosely Coupled Conflict 
The growth of the anti-abortion movement, the pro-family movement, 
the anti-busing movement, the rise of Moral ~ajority, Phyllis Schlafley's 
Eagle Forum, and the victory of Ronald Reagan has spawned a small industry 
of scholarly and -popular writing about conservative and reactionary social 
movements. Quite reasonably, sociologists have joined the parade. (See 
Useem on the anti-busing movement in Boston, Useem and Zald, 1983, on the 
pronuclear power movement, and Lo, 1982 and Mottl, 1981 for more general 
treatments. ) 
These writings join an earlier body of literature examining right- 
wing movements (for instance, Lipset and Raab, 1970; Daniel Aaron, 1981; 
Bell, 1964). This paper, too, gains momentum from our awareness of the 
growth of right-wing movements. But its thrust, its angle of vision, is 
somewhat different. Most students of conservative movements search for 
their social bases, leading organizations, and actors. They do for counter- 
movements what others have done for movements. But our interests are more 
interactional. We are interested in how movements generate a countermovement, 
and how they then engage in a loosely coupled tango of mobilization and 
demobilization. We are interested in how, in the language of McCarthy 
& Zald (1977; 1981), the structure of the SM:industry shapes the tactics 
and structure of the CM industry. Finally, we wish to explore the relation- 
ships among movement, countermovement, and authority. 
Our central premise is that movements of any visibility and impact 
create the conditions for the mobilization of countermovements. By ad- 
vocating change, by attacking the established interests, by mobilizing 
symbols and raising costs to others, they create grievances and provide 
opportunities for organizational entrepreneurs to define counternovement 
goals and issues. In the last two decades social movement researchers 
have expanded their analytic and empirical frame of reference. We now have 
a rich set of tools and concepts to be used in studying social movements-- 
the social psychology of attitudes and ideology, the dimensions and con- 
. . 
ditions of solidarity, the nature of SMO change, the processes of resource 
mobilization, the analysis of competition and conflict among MOs are part 
of the kit bag of sociology. And recently we have begun to examine the 
interaction of authorities and movements (Tilly, Marx), ant important and 
much neglected topic. What is surprising, however, is the neglect of the 
dynamic inter-play of movement and countermovement. Much of a movement's 
activity is aimed at neutralizing, confronting, or discrediting its corres- 
ponding countermovement. Similarly, the countermovement gains its. impetus 
. . 
and grows from showing-the harmful effects of the movement.. It attacks the 
movement leaders, bombs its sites of program action, and associates the 
movement with evil. It chooses its tactics in response to the structure 
I and tactics of the mov&ment. 
This paper addresses three interlinked questions in movement-counter- 
movement analysis. First, what are the determinants of the timing and 
strength of countermovement mobilization? Countermovements vary in how 
rapidly they mobilize and in the strength of their mobilization. They may 
or may not appear when the movement is at its peak and they may not "match" 
the movement in form of mobilization and organization. These differences 
then shape the forms of movement-countermovement interaction. Second, we 
wish to describe the battle joined. How do movement and countermovement 
conflict: In which sites? With which repertoires and strategies? In the 
extreme case the movement has all but disappeared as the countermovement 
'we suspect that the neglect of movement-countermovement interaction is 
related to the difficulties of diachronic, processual and interactional analysis, 
especially when it is applied to such diffuse and changing entities as social 
movements. 
attempts to undo its effects. At the other extreme, movement and counter- 
movement may be locked in direct collective violent combat. Rappoport's 
analysis of the forms of conflict as fights, games and debates will be 
of use here. Third, how are authorities involved in movement-counter- 
movement interaction? Since social movements, especially those aimed 
at political change, (in contrast to expressive and religious movements), 
fight for a change in authoritative allocations, authorities are often 
centrally involved in CM interaction. 
I Getting Started: Countermovement Mobilization 
The growth of a movement is not neatly balanced by the growth of the 
countermovement. Opponents of a movement, those who have preferences at 
variance with the movement, may not take the movement seriously. They 
may label the movement participants as. deviant and marginal ,(Gitlin, 1980; 
Schur, 1979); they may lack awareness of other individuals and groups that 
also oppose the movement; they may believe that their own claims on authori- 
ties are so strong and that their own beliefs are so clearly legitimate, 
that the movement.has little chance for success. To the extent that mo- 
bilization of M and CM are tightly coupled it is-likely that a spiral of 
mobilization and conflict occurs. (See Coleman, 1956; Heirich, 1970) 
On the other hand, to the extent that movement and countermovement are only 
loosely coupled the cycle of mobilization for one side may be quite se- 
parate from the cycle of mobilization for the other.? What are some of the 
major determinants of the emergence and growth of countermovements? We 
discuss four factors--movement progress and success, the formulation of 
CM ideology, resource availability, and constraints and opportunities in 
 or a recent sophisticated discussion of the notion of spirals of 
conflict, see Kriesberg, 1982. 
'. . 
the public arena. 
A. Movement progress and success. Movement representatives may be 
contending for redefinitions of policy and authoritative allo&ations, and 
even gaining some success, yet opponents of the movement may assume that 
authorities are protecting them or that the successes of the movement 
cannot or need not be contested. Doug McAdams (1982) perceptively notes 
that Roosevelt's accession to the Presidency created a belief amongst the 
NAACP leadership that. opportunities for civil rights actions were- present. 
Throughout the late'l940s and early fifties small civil right successions 
were won, and some defeats were occasioned (e.g., Harry- Truman desegre- 
gated.-.the mi1itary;open primaries and the seating of .black- delegates at 
state and national party conventions became zones of combat). But supporters 
of the status quo believed that local politicians and national represen- 
tatives were protecting segregationist interests.' Little organization of 
opposition outside of established channels occurred. However, success in 
capturing central.policies or symbols signals to the opposition that 
established means are no longer sufficient. At that time,'an organized 
countermovement is facilitated. For example, movement victories in cases 
before the U.S. Supreme Court crystallized the anti-abortion and Southern 
anti-civil rights movement. The anti-abortion movement emerged following 
the Supreme Court decision to decriminalize abortion in 1973 and the White 
Citizens' councils date from the 1954 decision that it was illegal to racially 
segregate schools. Thus, it is a particular kind of movement victory-- 
one that signals that'the government is now willing' to promote the interests 
of the.mo'vement's constituency, - that is likely to generate a countermovement. 
A countermovement has'difficulty maintaining mobilization, however, 
if the movement.wins a large victory. Under these circumstances, the counter- 
movement will become paralyzed as supporters see little chance of success. 
For example, by the mid-1960s, the Southern white resistance had dissipated, 
- .. . . 5 
even though the civil rights movement continued its struggle. Between 1954 
and the early 1960s the civil rights movement gained the moral support of a 
broad sector of the American public and'the legal and coercive backing of the, 
federal government. We suspect that the segregationists' failure to keep 
schools in the South segregated, when they had claimed that they would never 
allow black children to go to school with whites, contributed to their in- 
ability to mobilize in the next phase of the civil rights movement. (Bartley, 
1969; Carter, 1959; McMiller, 1971). 
B. Appropriate CM Ideology. Mobilization will be difficult and slow 
unless a movement articulates an ideology which arouses enthusiasm and creates 
commitment (Bottomore, 1979: 47). Countermovements often lack such an 
ideology at the outset, but may develop it as the struggle proceeds. For 
example, the Catholic Church's doctrine concerning the "sacredness" of life 
provided the anti-abortion movement with an ideology in place around which 
the movement could mobilize. This relatively narrow doctrine, however, was 
not capable of mobilizing individuals outside the church, less theologically 
attuned. Only with the development of an ideology about the relationship 
of abortion to family life and the role of women in society was the anti- 
abortion movement able to draw on a broader constituency. Similarly, the 
pronuclear movement was initially mobilized around the industry's claim that 
nuclear power is a'safe and efficient energy source (Useem & Zald, 1983). 
However, the mobilization of a constituency outside the industry required 
a doctrine relating nuclear power to the promotion of the standard of living, 
achievement of independence on foreign oil, and establishing the altruism 
of its own constituency in comparison to the self-serving goals of the anti- 
nuclear activists. Countermovements may have to "remember the answers," 
rediscover the justification for pol.icies and which have slipped 
into the implicit assumptions of society. 
C. Availability of resources. Countermovements may.be delayed if there 
are no groups with discretionary resources available to invest in collective 
action. A countermovement's location in the social structure will largely 
determine the availability of such resources. Usually, movements. are 
launched by groups from "below" and attack established interests. Since 
they respond to these attacks, counte~ovements will often be linked to 
established interests and organizations. Countermovements' ties to the 
established order will tend to both help and hinder the provision of the 
requisite resources. On the one hand, countermovements will be launched 
by-corporate groups rich in fungible resources such as money, office space, 
and clerical help. On the other hand, the countermovement's ties to the 
established order may preclude the use of these resources for non-instituti- 
onalized action. The nuclear power industry, for example, controlled many 
of the resources needed by the pronuclear movement, but was reluctant to 
provide them. The industry was accountable to stockholders, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, and other federal, state, and local government 
agencies. These ties prevented the use of industry resources for any but 
the most mild type of protest. 
These difficulties, however, are not necessarily insuperable. One 
strategy used by countermovements is to maintain a decentralized, loosely 
articulated, structure. This allows individuals and groups within the 
countermovement to provide the necessary resources to other groups, and yet 
allows them to disassociate themselves from actions taken by groups it has 
helped bring into existence, For example, Boston's political establishment 
was heavily involved in the anti-busing movement launched in that city 
in the fall of 1974. City officials held key posts in the anti-busing move- 
ment organization and the facilities of city hall were used for anti-busing 
0 
activities. City officials, however, could not easily advocate violence 
or other illegal forms of resistance, since the federal court and U.S. 
Justice Department were closely monitor.ing their actions; Several of them 
were lawyers, and feared disbarment and the loss of their livelihood,should 
they openly resist the federal court. Militant and occasionally illegal 
actions, however, were taken by other adherents. For example, during the 
first two years of desegregation, anti-busing protestors congregated in 
front of the schools in their neighborhood. . The demonstrators taunted black 
students .as they entered and left the school and on several occasions hurled 
rocks at buses carrying blacks. After one such protest, a crowd of several 
hundred attacked and beat a black man who had happened to stop his car 
at a red light near the demonstration.. The anti-busing leaders did not 
participate in these "spontaneous" actions. Although the established leader- 
ship'did not actually,participate in these actions, they often provided 
their tacit support for them. For example,.Elvira "Pixie"Palladino, 
a top leader in the anti-busing organization ROAR and elected member of the 
School Committee, commented on the beating of a black man: "My first reaction 
from the pit of my stomach, was that he got exactly what he deserved. 
He had no business of being over there [South Boston1 in the first place," 
(Boston Globe, 5/25/75). 
The general point is that authorities and established interests may be 
constrained from mobilization to resist a movement. Only as new vehicles 
are created, can the countermovement realize its full oppositional potential. 
D. Constraint and Opportunity. CM mobilization is also facilitated 
or dampened by intervening events in society and political life. We have 
already argued that CM sympathizers do not mobilize immediately because 
they may lack a sense of immediacy and threat, appropriate ideology, and 
an infrastructure df resources. But even if these conditions are met, 
the changing political-public scene inhibits the opportunities for mo- 
bilization, coalition, and appearance on'the public agenda. 
A number of' scholars have begun to articulate a political process- 
opportunity model that stresses the receptivity=non-receptivity of the 
political environment that encourages or discourages mobilization. (See 
McAdams, Tarrow, Eisinger, Walker). Without being exhaustive, we list 
structures and processes that facilitate and hinder CM (and M) mobilization. 
1) Dominating events, such as popular wars, and depressions, crowd 
out some social movements and countermovements. They do so by creating 
central foci of attention for authorities, elites, and large segments of 
the public and institutions. Popular warts create an atmosphere where the 
expression of discontent and conflict.isperceived as unpatriotic. Both 
the right wing reaction to Roosevelt (Miles, 1980) and labor-management 
conflict was suppressed by the outbreak of World War 11. 
Large events such as wars not only crowd the agenda, they may 
discredit movement and countermovement leaders. Kyvig argues that the 
first group of leaders of the anti-prohibition forces were discredited 
in the period around World War I, because so many brewers were of German 
origin. 
2) Political instability creates opportunities for movements both 
by providing current.models for action and by limiting the repressive-control 
possibilities of authorities. Movements and countermovements learn from 
each other. Just as the women's movement and the gay rights movement learned 
from the civil rights movement, so, too, did the anti-abortion countermovement 
and the pronuclear power movement learn from these earlier movements. Reper- 
toires of organization and tactics can be copied from foes as well as friends. 
Political instability is also reflected in the rise and fall of new 
parties and political alsgnment. At such times established authorities 
or contenders may seek.new allies. 
3) Elections encourage already developed movements and countermovements 
both because they create a focus on politics, providing opportunities for 
immediate gains or losses in political power, and leading to ideological 
polarization and appeals. However, it may well be that approaching elections 
are more useful for movements and countermovements already organized and 
mobilized than for facilitating early mobilization. During an early stage, 
elections may provide an alternate focus, crowding out new issues and non- 
electorally related mobilization. 
4) Changes in electoral coalitions and the rise and fall of politi- 
cally oriented groups and organizations also present opportunities and 
threats to movements and countermovements. These changes in coalitional 
and power potential change risk-reward balances. No simple proposition 
summarizes the relation of coalitional possibilities to M/CM mobilization, 
but the sharper or more dramatic the shift in coalitional alignments, the 
more likely it is that movement mobilization is clearly facilitated. 
The model of countermovement mobilization which we have described 
helps account for the degree to which M/CM are tightly coupled. To the 
-extent that the CM is much delayed, whether because of the intervention of 
dominating events, the absence of appropriate ideology, the lack of an 
infra-structure of resources, or the constraints of political structure 
and opportunity, to the extent that the movement is largely demobilized 
by the time the CM emerges, direct M/CM conflict does not occur. The CM 
fights the ghost.of the movement as it attempts to convince the authorities 
and bystander publics to turn back the clock. Short of that extreme, groups 
and individuals aligned with M and CM may lock in direct and violent con- 
frontation, may join in formal legal suits, may lobby competitively, or 
may engage in debates with unseen adversaries before unseen audiences. 
1.1. The Battle Joined. 
Central to M/CM analysis is a description of the strategies and tactics 
and forms of conflict, how and where they interact. A wide range of forms 
of battle exists, from direct confrontation, to 1obby.ing authorities, to 
speaking to disparate audiences, to debating the shadows of previous gener- 
ations. Moreover', they have a wide range of strategic goals and.tactics. 
They attempt to inhibit each other's mobilization, as well as persuade 
authorities and bystanders. 
Forms of meeting. 
Where do they meet? How do they proceed.to achieve goals? M/CM may 
meet head-on in an "encounter," a face-to-face interaction with.a single 
focus of attention (Garrison, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982:- p. 1'0). In an encounter, >. , 
members of each group have a heightened awareness of the other group, and 
respond accordingly. The most dramatic encounters often take place "on 
the streets" or other public locations loosely regulated by authorities. 
For example, during the height of Boston school desegregation controversy, 
local anti-busing movement advocates became deeply involved In a racial con- 
frontation between blacks and whites at Carson beach, a strip of public beach 
between all-white South Boston and a black housing project. The conflict 
began when a white crowd attacked sfx black salesmen visiting the city 
who were strolling on the beach, The NAACP then organized a "picnic" demon- 
stration several days later to assert blacks' rights to usc5 the beach. 
The anti-busing leaders organized a counter-demonstration, A massive fight 
broke out between the two demonstrating groups. For at least some participants, 
the confrontation is a fight, designed to fully defeat the enemy. 
Other types of encounters are more structured and rule governed. 
They resemble debates or games. For example, the representatives of the pro- 
and antinuclear movements have frequently debated on university campuses 
and television public affairs shows. Here, the encounter occurs to influence 
amorphous third parties. No immediate decision is,_expect-ed. The most highly - - 
structured type of an encounter setting is probably the court case, which 
combines game and debate characteristics. Many of the cases described in 
Joel Handler's Social Movements and the Legal System (1979) involve movement 
and countermovement representation in legal battle (see also Barkin). 
Second, movement and countermovement can be joined in the sense that 
they attempt to influence the same third parties. For example, the movement 
to legalize marijuana and the countermovement to oppose its legalization 
are both attempting to influence the public, national and stake legislators, 
and the medical establishment, Rarely, however, have they met in a face- 
to-face encounter. Lobbyists are involved in indirect competition. 
Finally, movement and countermovement may.be joined only in the sense 
that they attempt to undo the effects of the other: It is a countermovement, 
not a new movement, to the extent that it is engaged with organizations and 
actors representing the original movement, or it debates the position of 
the movement. The anti-prohibition groups that fought for the repeal of 
prohibition come close to being a new movement. They were led by different 
groups than 'had led the original battle. Indeed, they were led by elite 
businessmen'(who were Dupont connected).. They were not so much pro-alcohol 
as they were anti-government interference. They converted some.supporters 
of prohibitio? by arguing that prohibition was not eliminating alcohol 
drinking at the same time that it was contributing to lawlessness and "lack 
of respect for law." The - AAPA was originally bi-partisan, but saw the 
Democrats and Roosevelt a s  more l i k e l y  suppor ters  of r epea l .  Raskob, t h e  
l eader  of AAPA, became t h e  chairman of t h e  Democratic pa r ty .  The l eaders  
of AAPA s p l i t  from t h e  Democrats when they bel ieved t h a t  Roosevelt was .-- 
tak ing a s t a t i s t  tack.    an^ of them went on t o  found t h e  Liber ty  League, 
an organiza t ion  dedicated t o  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e . r o l e  of government. We con- 
s i d e r  AAPA a countermovement because it d i d  confront  some of t h e  same groups 
t h a t  had supported p r o h i b i t i o n  and because t h e  debate was framed i n  terms 
of t h e  value of t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  which t h e  o r i g i n a l  movement had promoted. 
A t  any one po in t  i n  time, M/CM may vary widely i n  t h e  form of t h e i r  
c o n f l i c t .  The form of c o n f l i c t  a t  one po in t  i n  time, shapes-: s t r a t e g y  and 
x .  - 
t a c t i c s  f o r  t h e  next round. 
S t r a t e g i c  goals  and t a c t i c s  of movement/countermovement i n t e r a c t i o n .  
A s  noted, movement and countermovement i n t e r a c t i o n s  may vary i n  t h e  
environmental context  i n  which they meet. They may a l s o  vary i n  t h e  extent  
t o  which t h e  groups locked i n  c o n f l i c t  seek t o  exclude t h e  o t h e r  group 
from t h e  p o l i t i c a l  arena.  Movement and countermovement may at tempt t o  
d i r e c t l y  damage o r  des t roy  t h e  o the r  group, preempt o r  dissuade t h e  o the r  
group from mobil izing,  o r  r e c r u i t  t h e  o the r  group's  members. 
Damaging ~ctions. One strategy used by movements and countermove&ents 
is to try to raise the co'st of mobilization for the other group. Let us 
examine in some detail the efforts of the pronuclear movement to raise these 
costs for the antinuclear movement. 
The pronuclear movement took a number of actions against the antinuclear 
movement. The categories used to describe these activities are drawn from 
Marx's (1979) discussion of the most prevalent forms of government action 
against the protest movements of the.1960~. .We discuss attempts to gather 
information, limit the flow of resources, and portray the antinuclear move- 
1 ment in a- negative light. 
A. Information Gathering. A central aspect of government efforts to 
. . 
damage the protest movements in the 1960s was the ocllection of information 
on dissidents. As Marx notes, "knowing that agents are gathering information 
I on it may make a social movement less open and democratic, require that 
limited resourses be devoted to security, and may deter participationn(1979: 99). 
- - . - - - - . . . .  . - 
3 ~ w o  caveats are necessary. First, when we consider the pronuclear 
movement's effort to damage the antinuclear movement, it is often difficult 
to distinguish "industry activities" from "movement activities." For example, 
when a utility company presses charges against antinuclear "trespassers," is 
this a pronuclear movement activity or simply a business effort to protect 
its property? We consider activities directed against the antinuclear forces 
"movement" activities, when those who initiate or engage in them view them as 
part of a political struggle. 
Second, our focus is on specific social movement efforts to damage 
other social movements, Of less concern are the broader strategies used 
by one movement to defeat another (see our comments on preemptive strate- 
gies, below). Thus, we assume that general issues concerning M/CM interaction 
can be distinguished from specific actions taken by one movement to damage 
another. For example, the attempt of anti-abortion movement groups to 
amend the constitution would be treated as part of overall strategy, not 
an action directed against the pro-abortion movement. Bombings of abortion 
clinics or disruption of pro-abortion rallies would be treated as direct 
acts against the movement. 
Some pronuclear groups have initiated surveillance activities of antinuclear 
activists and organizations. Utility companies have taken p5ctures of anti- 
nuclear demonstrators, copied license plate numbers near antinuclear rallies, 
and maintained files of individual antinuclear activists (Wall Street Journal, 
1/14/79). Whether these information gathering activities are intended to 
damage the antinuclear movement is open to question. Industry spokespeople 
claim that they are part of legitimate security measures. Nuclear power 
critics, however, charge that the surveillance programs are designed to 
discourage support for their movement. For example, in a hearing before a 
state regulatory commission, an antinuclear group charged that a utility's 
surveillance program had served to "suppress and chill opponents of nuclear 
power and anyone else who differs from (the company's) policies" (Wall Street 
Journal, 1/11/79) . 
In addition to collecting their own information, several utility com- 
panies hired security firms to collect information on antinuclear protestors. 
A West Coast utility publicly acknowledged that it retained two security 
firms, Research West and Information Digest, for that purpose; Similar 
information was revealed in files obtained in the litigation that followed 
the 1977 and 1978 Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site. There 
the utility also hired two private security firms, Operational Systems, Inc. 
and Information Digest, to obtain'information on the Clamshell Alliance 
(Center for National.Security Studies, 1981: 69) . 
At least one "citizens" group, 'the U-S, Labor Party, collected infor- 
mation on the anti's for the explicit purpose of damaging the movement. 
The Seabrook files mentioned above revealed that the Labor Party had pro- 
vided the New Hampshire State Police and the FBI with details of the Clam- 
shell's tactical plans to occupy the power plant. When asked about these 
and other efforts to collect information on the antinuclear movement, a 
Labor Committee spokesman stated: "This is political warfare. We're 
running a political intelligence operation to expose them (antinuclear 
activists). We will cooperate with any organization willing to root out 
this evil" (Guardian, 12/5/79). The Labor Committee also claims to have 
infiltrated the Clamshell Alliance, including its top leadership, for the 
purposes of information gathering (Guardian, 12/5/79). 
Finally, the industry's two main trade associations, Atomic Industrial 
Forum and Edison Electric Institute, maintained :files on antinuclear 
opponents. In at least one instance, the trade associations requested 
utility companies in a number of cities to attend and report-ba~k on meetings 
of a particular antinuclear group (Washington Post, 11/21/77). In addition, 
the AIF allegedly disseminated information on antinuclear leaders to its 
members, including utility companies (Campaign for Political Rights, 1979. 3). 
B. Restricting Resources. Another tactic used by the government to 
damage protest movements in the 1960s was to restrict the flow of resources 
to them, physical space, and employment opportunities (Marx, 1979: 99-100). 
The pronuclear movement also attempted to reduce the antinuclear.:forces' 
access to resources; .Pronuclear activists tried to eliminate the federal 
funding of citizen intervenors in regulatory 'proceedings. The Federal 
Trade Commission, ACTION, the Department of Energy, and other governmental 
agencies and programs traditionally provided such funds (Metzger, 1980: 40). 
Several pronuclear movement organizations, such as Americans for Nuclear 
Energy and the Nuclear Legislative Adivsory Services, led efforts to prevent 
further disbursement of government funds to antinuclear intervenor groups 
(Nuclear Legislative Advisory Service, 6/21/81; Nuclear Advocate, 6/80). 
In another effort, several campus chapters of pronuclear movement groups 
organized efforts to eliminate the use of student fees to fund campus anti- 
nuclear organizations (Interview Nos. 19, 25). 
Finally, two pronuclear groups have used civil litigation to finan- 
cially damage an antinuclear organization. The New Hampshire Voice of 
Energy (NHVOE) and Americans for More Power Sources AMPS) have sued the 
Coalition for Direct Action at Seabrook, a faction within the Clamshell 
Alliance. The suit's stated purpose is to "recover the cost to the tax- 
payer for the added protection necessary to protect life, limb and property" 
during demonstrations at the Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site 
(INFO -No. 143, 1980: 4). According to Tina Coruth, president of NHVOE, 
"Our suit is a way for the Seabrook demonstrators to pay their own way. 
It's not right for the New Hampshire taxpayer to pick up the tab for the 
added police protection during those antinuclear demonstrations" (INFO No. 143, 
1980: 4). 
C. Efforts to Produce a Negative Image, Another technique used to 
damage the movement in the 1960s was to create an unfavorable public image 
of it (March, 1979: 96-98). The pronuclear movement has also used this 
strategy. Several. utility companies have collected and disseminated dero- 
gatory information on antinuclear groups, Between 1973 and 1977 Georgia 
Power Company, for example, operated a sophisticated surveillance program 
on company critics, including the antinuclear Georgia Power Project. 
A former company investigator described the surveillance program as "dirt 
gathering" efforts to label its opponents as "commies and queers" (Center 
for National Security Studies, 1981: 67-68). Similarly, in 1978, Phila- 
delphia Electric Company photographed antinuclear demonstrators and kept 
files on their activities. The company gave copies of the photographs to 
a local television station which used them in a story that ridiculed the 
demonstrators. An antinuclear group filed an administrative complaint 
with the State Public Service Commission, charging that rate payers' money 
was being i l l e g a l l y  used on a  campaign t o  spy on.and "suppress and smear" 
. c r i t i c s  of nuclear  power (Center f o r  Na t iona l 'Secur i ty  Studies ,  1981: 75) .  
The U. S. Labor Pa r ty  has a l s o  attempted t o  d i s c r e d i t  t h e  an t inuc lea r  
movement. I n  1977, t h e  Labor Par ty  t o l d  New Hampshire s t a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
t h a t  a  planned demonstration a t  Seabrook cons t ruc t ion  s i t e  was "nothing bu t  
a  cover f o r  t e r r o r i s t  a c t i v i t y "  (Center .£or  National  Secur i ty  Studies ,  
1981: 7 ) .  Governor Meldrim Thompspn and t h e  Manchester Union-Leader 
accepted and widely publ ic ized  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n .  The Labor Par ty  has made 
s i m i l a r  c h a r g e s . a g a i n s t  an t inuc lea r  a c t i v i s t s  i n  Maryland and New York 
(Center f o r  National  Secur i ty  Studies ,  1981: 7 ) .  
The pronuclear  movement was i , n i t i a t e d  t o  d i r e c t l y  counter  the  increased 
success of  t h e  a n t i ' s  i n  mobilizi.ng pub l i c  support.  I n  o t h e r  cases ,  the  
b a t t l e  may be more i n d i r e c t .  Movement and Countermovement may at tempt t o  
r a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  segments of t h e  publ ic  and/or reference  e l i t e s  t o  br ing  
p ressure  on a u t h o r i t i e s .  O r  t h e  movement may be f i g h t i n g  a  l e g a l  b a t t l e  
i n  c o u r t ,  while some countermovement organiza t ion  l eads  a  l e g i s l a t i v e  b a t t l e .  
Preemptive S t r a t e g i e s .  A movement may design i t s  s t r a t e g y  and t a c t i c s  
i n  ways which'undercut  t h e  moral and p o l i t i c a l  b a s i s  of a  counter-or a  
counter-counter mobil izat ion.  Ghandi's satyagraha campaigns i n  India  and 
South Af r i ca ,  f o r  example, were designed t o  undercut t h e  moral p o s i t i o n  
of t h e i r  opponents. 
S imi la r ly ,  Oberschall  (1973: Ch.6) argues t h a t  Martin Luther King 
succeeded i n  p a r t  because he delayed a  major counter-at tack by Southern 
whites,  White c o n t r o l  of jobs and c r e d i t ,  t h e  cour t  system, and the  po l i -  
t i c a l  apparatus gave t h e  white power s t r u c t u r e  s u f f i c i e n t  leverages t o  
crush a  black insurgency. King.'s t a c t i c  of non-violent r e s i s t a n c e  made 
d i r e c t  r e t a l i a t i o n  more d i f f i c u l t :  
King must be seen as a man who solved a technical problem 
that had stumped Negro leaders for generations. As a powerless 
group living in the middle of a powerful majority that hated and 
feared them, Negroes could not stage an open revolt. To go unto 
the streets under those conditions with open demands for change 
was suicidal . . . King and the sit-in students solved the tech- 
nical problems by clothing a national resistance movement in the 
comforting garb of love, forgiveness, and nonviolence, a trans- 
formation that enabled Negroes to stage an open revolt without 
calling it an open revolt. (Lerone Bennett, quoted in Oberschall 
1973: 22). 
Choice of strategy involves much beyond merely the nature of the oppo- 
sition - the repertoires of action, constituency acceptability, resources 
available, and relations to authorities. But one component affecting choice 
is.M/CM relations. Strategy is multi-pronged and multi-functional. It addresses 
by-standers,.authorities, reference elites, and opposition groups. 
Persuasion and Recruitment. Finally, movements and countermovements may 
attempt to persuade the members of the opposition group to join their side 
of the controversy. 
In general, movements and countermovements are unlikely to use this 
strategy in the short-run. First, it requires an individual to disengage 
from one movement and then engage in one opposed it- .- The individual 
must both reverse his or her ideological position, and oppose a group of 
people with which he or she was recently associated. Second, the pool 
of neutral bystanders is usually much larger, and more accessible, than 
the number of potentially recruitable individuals in the opposition group. 
Thus, recruitment drives aimed at bystanders is likely to net more recruits 
than one directed at the opposition. 
Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which movements can recruit 
from the opposition group. For instance, the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks 
assumed a movement/countermovement relationship in the period between the 
February and October revolutions. The Bolsheviks triumphed in part because 
they recruited large numbers of disaffected Mensheviks. Factors that made 
the transfer of allegiance possible included Menshevik 'support of an in- : . .. . 
creasingly unpopular war, an emerging belief that only the Bolsheviks could 
defend the government against counter-revokutionary forces , and Bolshevik 
support of workers taking over factories and peasants seizing land 
(Thomas, 1981). In our own time we have seen "neo-conservatives" emerge 
from among the intellectual leaders of the moderate left. We suspect 
that conversion occurs in loosely coupled conflict over long time periods 
more than in tightly coupled conflict. 
The battle joined includes conflict in the courts, in the streets, 
and in the hearts and minds of persons. Often.it involves the attempt 
of movement or. countermovement-to gain the cooperation of authorities. 
Yet there are a -wide number of authority - M/CM relations possible. 
4 
111. Movement, Countermovement, and Authorities 
The traditional model of social movement analysis begins from a stable 
 here is a bothersome analytic-conceptual issue in this section-- 
is any action of an authority that bears on M/CM interaction part of the 
M or CM? Stated differently, how does one differentiate political and 
authoritative action from M/MC action? A definitive answer cannot be given, 
but a range of answers can, At one extreme, action by authorities that is 
well institutionalized and legitimated in the social system may have impact 
on social movements but is not in itself considered social movement activity. 
Through fully institutionalized means, Margaret Thatcher has impact on the 
fate of conservatism and socialism in Great Britain. On the other hand, 
Costa-Gravas' " Z "  and CIA'S intervention against Allende in Chile are examples 
of countermovement activity. This view of M/CM activity as it relates to the 
action of authorities is based upon a western'legal rational- model of state 
activity. It posits a separate institutionalized political sphere, with 
Ms and CMs operating outside of, or at the margin of, the institutionalized 
sphere. 
At the other extreme, if one takes an ideational view of social movements, 
ignoring or downplaying the mobilization of movement activity in the definition 
of social movement, the distinction between state action and social movement 
action becomes meaningless. Then Margaret Thatcher is clearly part of the 
conservative countermovement, indeed a leader of it. But then one loses the 
ability to make distinctions between social movement activity and political 
activity in general (or one shifts it down a level, to the distinction between 
institutionalized and un-institutionalized) . We maintain the distinction 
between authoritative action and social movement (or countermovement) action. 
However, to the extent that state action is largely directed to carrying out 
pro or anti-social movement actions, we have a conceptual difference with little 
empirical relevance. 
position - a government in place, facing groups with routine access (members) 
and groups .with no access. As groups with no access develop grievances 
they attempt to gain access and may mobilize social movements. Similarly, 
groups. with routine access may find their ability to gain authoritative 
allocations undermined. They, too, may resort to social movement mobilization. 
State officials, authorities and their differentiated agents (civil servants, 
military officers), may have their own interests. They may "represent" 
groups in civil society, but they may also embody ideologies and interests 
which lead them to press for changes in other parts of the state apparatus. 
Yet, it is also possible for groups to conflict in society with but minimal 
state intervention; movement and countermovement proceed with marginal use 
of the police and authorities. Figure 1 presents some of the possible models 
of authority, M/CM relations. 
. . ............................. 
. . 
Figure 1 about here 
. . . .  . .  ............................. 
It would be possible to present a more graphically elegant and com- 
plicated set of models. Negative and positive..lines could be added, identi- 
ties between state and SM made, intensities shaded. But for our crude and 
preliminary purposes, these will suffice to illustrate the range of relations. 
. . 
Model A, Conflict with minimal state intervention, occurs where the 
movement and countermovement battle for members or for control with little 
attempt to change.laws or to gain state support. Bromley and Shupe and 
Shupe, Bromley and Busching have examined'the relationship between the 
~ n i f  ication Church (~oonies) and anti-Moonies in these terms. The anti- 
Moonies consisted of the parents of Moonies and deprogrammers. The state 
could have become involved if the police had been willing to intervene when 
Figure I 
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the church claimed their members were being kidnapped. The deprogrkners 
and parents used the rhetoric of "family matters" to insulate the police 
from action. 
A striking feature of this model is how few cases it describes. ' 
Movement and countermovement usually appeal to authorities. First, move- 
ments do not control the resources and are not sufficiently stable to 
implement major changes in society. Rather, they attempt to shift the cost 
of achieving change from themselves to the government and polity at large. 
The civil rights movement, for example, could to some extent desegregate 
public facilities through their own actions. The lunch-counter sit-ins 
were in part an attempt to directly affect change. Still, the changes they 
sought were so massive that they co.uld,only be' achieved Ghen the govern- 
ment applied its resources to the problem. Similarly, antinuclear demonstrators 
have occupied plant construction sites with the purported goal of physically 
blocking further construction. Still, the overall success of the movement 
depended much more on the position taken by the government than specific 
effects of its actions on the industry. 
Second, usually one side or the other will perceive that it is in their 
interest to seek the involvement of authorities. Schattschneider's (1960) 
analysis suggests that this will .tend to be the weaker of the two parties, 
since the stronger will generally prevail as long as the dispute remains 
private. If, however, the stronger party feels that the government is 
reasonably certain to take its side, it will seek the involvement of state 
authorities. A clear example is offered by a recent dispute between an 
insurgency movement in the U.S. Steel Workers Union and established leadership. 
The insurgency movement, led by Ed Sadlowski, had expanded the scope of the 
conflict by obtaining the financial support of liberal and radical groups 
outside of the union. The union leadership sued in federal court to prevent 
the insurgent group from receiving outside help, and won in a Supreme Court 
decision. 
Model B, Authority is the countermovement, occurs where the movement 
directly attacks the state and the state is the countermovement. Arno Mayer's -
analysis of conservative authorities' response to working class upheavals 
from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, starts from an identity .. 
of interest between conservative groups and state authority. Authorities 
and conservative .interests are at one. In our own time, the anti-war movement 
of the 1960s directly attacked the state. 
Model C places the state at the center of the conflict between movement 
and countermovement. Both movement and countermovement attempt to convince 
authorities of their position and demonstrate their strength. The triangle 
is "open," however, since movement and countermovementdo not directly 
attack each other. The struggle over repeal of prohibition looks something 
like this. Model C is a model of competitive debate. The - AAPA used pub- 
licity campaigns and contributed funds to political parties and appealed to 
officials who would support the repeal of the Volstead Act. 
The "closed" triangle of Model D suggests that movement and counter- 
movement seek to both make demands on the government and damage the other 
movement. The model describes the conflict between the pro- and antinuclear 
movements, as described above. It also, in part, describes the pro- and 
anti-abortion movement. The antis have picketed and even bombed Family 
Planning clinics. 
Model E represents a revolutionary situation, where movement and counter- 
movement have established that to a significant part of the population they 
are t.he authorities. The movements control territory, raise taxes, conscript 
soldiers and perform other governmental functions (Tilly, 1978: 190-1921. 
. . . 24 
Model F indicates that the local government can be aligned with counter- 
movements in a struggle against central authorities. Eisenhower's calling 
out of the troops in Little Rock signalled to local authorities the limits of 
their opposition. It shifted the balance of forces for the next decade 
(Ashmore, 1982). The model describes the anti-busing movement in Boston 
and the anti-civil rights movement in the South. In both cases, local officials 
helped sponsor and mobilize a countermovement. National officials became 
aligned with the movement. National political structure thus shapes the form 
of M/CM conflict (see Garner and Zald). 
It would be possible to make this analysis more complex. Not only do 
local and national authorities vary in their movement alignments, but so 
do authorities in different agencies at the same level. But the purpose 
of the analysis is to embed M/CM interaction in the larger authority-political 
system. Ultimately- movement and countermovement contend for support. They 
attempt to make alliances, to seize opportunities for gaining power. The 
structured differentiation and ideology of authorities provides the ground 
for political opportunity. 
For politically oriented movements and countermovements, state authori- 
ties and agents are the target in view, their. actions are oriented to either 
changing authoritative allocations or,to becoming the authorities themselves. 
Whether.through' revolution, marginal accomodation-or conversion, the immediate 
target is state action. 
Movement and countermovement, of course, differ amongst themselves in 
the breadth and depth of their ideologies. How much change is necessary 
to "really" accomplish goals? The variation in'and depth of ideology relates 
to the symbolic framing of the debates. 
IV. Outcomes: History, Social Change & Social Movements 
It is possible for movements to be quite successful in winning specific 
authoritative allocations, yet have little impact on changing the definition 
of the situation. Conversely, all'of the short-run battle may be lost, 
but in the long run the grounds of decision making are radically changed. 
Our analysis of loosely coupled conflict is largely aimed at the short-run 
battle. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter the vital discussion 
of the nature of culture.and symbolic change that has been so invigorated 
in recent decades. Although we have no easy template for the study of sym- 
bolic change,, large progEess has been made: From tlie historical studies 
of Raymond Williams and John Dunn to the systematic study of political 
cognition of Gamson and Modigliani we are learning how to examine the trans- 
formation of symbol systems. Here we make some brief comments on the relation 
of ideology and symbolic attachments to movements and countermovements. 
First, movements and countermovements are nested in long waves of 
ideology and counter-ideology. Ideologies are nested in class relations 
and in culture. Our definition of social movements rests upon sentiments 
about change. These ideas are rooted in long term views about right action 
and the relations among groups, citizens and the state. The ground for 
mobilization must be prepared. 
Movement and countermovement must develop ideologies that convince 
by-standers and authorities of the rightness of their view. Social move- 
ments have the problem in their nascent.stage of getting on the agenda and 
of making their priorities and view of the world acceptable to those who 
think the ideas are strange and wrong. There are a wide variety of techniques 
for doing so. Principles of rhetoric and the social psychology of belief 
systems tell us something about how this occurs, whether or not SM cadre 
and leaders consciously use the principles. 
Countermovements have a different problem. They must "remember the 
answers." Often their leaders and cadre are in the position of defending 
I policies whose justifications have receded into the routine grounds. They 
seem to be going backward, their policies justify the status quo and 
established routines. The problem for many countermovements is how to make 
older symbols relevant to newer situations. They must both discredit the 
ideas of the movement and show how older ideologies have relevance to new 
situations. 
The long waves of ideology and counterideology are treated by historians 
of ideas. One point of entre for the sociologist of social movements is 
to map the nexusbetween idea entrepreneurs and specific SMOs and industry 
modes (see Himmelstein and Zald, forthcoming). 
An awareness of the long wave of movement ideology also points up 
another issue, the maintenance of social movement and countermovement 
sentiment under repression. It is striking how major ideologies and political 
values resurge when state repression is lifted. One would have thought that 
the Franco regime, with its thirty-five years of dominance, could have wiped 
out commitment to democracy, to socialism and communism. But the end of 
the regime was followed in short order by full-blown parties and ideological 
apparatuses. How many.generations does it take? How deeply into primary 
group structure must the state intrude in .order.to eliminate .civilizational 
ideologies, major systems of thought and belief about the social structure 
and possibilities? 
Finally, but related to the last, attention to the long waves of 
sentiments and symbols, raises the issue of how movements resurface over 
the decades. Feminism was strong in the early part of the century, died 
in the Great Depression, and was resurrected in the early 60s (Scharf, 1980). 
To some extent new leaders resurrect old exemplars and issues, recreate, 
selectively, our past to fit present needs. The debate between movement 
and countermovement draws upon the cultural stock, but transforms it 
(Gusf ield, 1981) . . 
- d  \ /' 
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